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INTRODUCTION

In August 2009, Lashawn Whitehead was at home with his baby
and his girlfriend's three-month-old puppy, Susie.1 Susie, a German
shepherd and Pit Bull mix,2 jumped onto the couch where
Whitehead's baby was resting.3 Whitehead became enraged.4 He

grabbed Susie by the fur, took her outside, and dripped lighter fluid
over her.5 Whitehead held her down and beat her for approximately
* @ 2012 Elizabeth Ann Overcash.
1. See Puppy Set on Fire, Left To Die, PET-ABUSE.COM, http://www.pet-abuse.com
/cases/16140/NCUS/ (last updated Mar. 8, 2010, 2:02 PM).
2. Id.
3. Ryan Seals, Suspect's Mother Says He Abused Dog To Protect Newborn, NEWS &
REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 18, 2009, at A2, available at http://www.newsrecord.com/content/2009/11/17/article/mother-saysson-abused-dogover fear-it-would_
harm-newborn.
4. Id.
5. Ryan Seals, Man Who Burned Puppy Sent to Prison, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro,
N.C.), Mar. 2, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.news-record.com/content/2010/03/01
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fifteen minutes, breaking her jaw and teeth, before finally setting her
on fire. 6 Two weeks later, Susie was found nearly dead in a
Greensboro, North Carolina, park with second and third degree
burns covering sixty percent of her body.7
Whitehead pleaded guilty to burning personal property and to
felony animal cruelty.8 The crime of burning personal property
carried a sentence of six to eight months in prison; however, the crime
of felony animal cruelty brought only probation with a possible
sentence of four to five months in prison if Whitehead violated the
terms of his probation. 9 This trivial sentence sparked a wave of
controversy and debate.10 Citizens sent letters and emails to state
legislators, 1 resulting in new legislation called Susie's Law.12 This new
law increases penalties for certain acts of animal cruelty in North
Carolina. 3
Susie's Law exemplifies the advancements taking place in animal
law in the United States. It continues the modern trend of animal law,
which is to provide more protection to animals, generally. 14 The
unfortunate truth of these laws, however, is that they apply to only a
specified class of animals, and they entirely exclude other animals,
such as those used in food production, medical research, and certain
forms of breeding. 5 Since not all exceptions may be discussed here,
this Comment will focus on the exclusion of agricultural animals.
These animals, including cows, pigs, and chickens, feel pain on a daily

/article/man_received_6_to_8_monthsin-prison-for burningpuppy.
6. See id.; Susie, N.C. VOTERS FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, http://ncvaw.org/susie/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
7. Susie, supra note 6.
8. Seals, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. See Susie, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. Susie's Law, ch. 16, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 16, 16 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-360 (2011)).
13. Dan Bowens, Susie's Law Toughens Penaltiesfor Animal Cruelty, WRAL (June
23, 2010), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7835724/.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act of 1970 § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2006) (excluding
from protection horses not used in research and other farm animals); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-360 (2011) (excluding from protection animals used in the activities of biomedical
research; training; production of livestock, poultry, or aquatic species; providing food for
human or animal consumption; and physical alteration to conform with breed or show
standards); Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5
ANIMAL L. 69, 78 (1999) ("Eighteen states provide an exemption for the practice of
slaughtering animals for food.").
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basis, but there are no public outcries, no legislative debates, and few,
if any, laws to protect them.
This Comment examines the progression of animal law-laws
concerning, relating to, and affecting the protection of animals-over
time, focusing on two sets of animals: companion animals 6 and
agricultural animals.17 As to the latter category, this Comment focuses
entirely on agricultural animals who reside on factory farms, 8 rather
than those owned by individual farmers, since "[f]actory farming now
accounts for more than 99 percent of all farmed animals raised and
slaughtered in the United States." 19 Part I discusses Susie's Law,
which exemplifies contemporary animal law's exclusion of
agricultural animals from anti-cruelty statutes. Part II presents a
survey of American animal law from the colonial era through the
twenty-first century, showing increasing concern for animals. Part III
provides a detailed look into current law concerning companion and
agricultural animals, focusing on how companion animals have
enjoyed increasing protection while agricultural animals have lost
almost all protection. Part IV considers reasons for the disparity in
this treatment, arguing that the reasons for the disparity are nothing
more than arbitrary cultural norms, which a truly egalitarian legal
system should not endorse. Finally, Part V proposes a solution to
remedy this discrepancy in the law.
I. SUSIE'S LAW

Susie's Law modifies section 14-360 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, making intentional starvation of an animal a felony,
where previously it was a misdemeanor. 20 Additionally, it increases
the punishment for torturing, cruelly beating, maiming, mutilating,
poisoning, or killing an animal to a higher class of felonies, giving
16. This Comment defines "companion animals" as animals owned by humans and
kept for companionship, protection, or out of a sense of affection toward the animal.
These are animals not kept for profit, production, or industrial or labor purposes.
17. This Comment defines "agricultural animals" as animals raised for food purposes,
being comprised largely of chickens, pigs, and cattle. Agricultural animals are the animals
killed most often in the United States, with the exception of animals killed in the seafood
industry, and, as this Comment will discuss, they are some of the least protected of all
animals. See Doris Lin, How Many Animals Are Killed Each Year?, ABOUT.COM, http://
(last
animalrights.about.com/od/animalrightsl01/tp/How-Many-Animals-Are-Killed.htm
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
18. For an explanation of factory farming, see infra Part III.B.
19. Factory Farming, FARM FORWARD, http://www.farmforward.com/farmingforward/factory-farming (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
20. See Susie's Law, ch. 16, § 1, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 16, 16 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT § 14-360(al)).
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violators an active sentence.2 1 Susie's Law is a triumph for animal
rights in North Carolina because it adds an increased level of
protection for North Carolina animals. This new law, however, does
not change the statute's original wording concerning which animals
the statute protects. The victory of Susie's Law belongs almost
entirely to companion animals, such as Susie herself. It does not apply
to agricultural animals.
Section 14-360 defines "animal" as "every living vertebrate in the
classes Amphibia, Reptilia, Aves, and Mammalia except human
beings. ' 22 However, the statute states that the term "animals" does
not apply to, among others, "livestock, poultry, or aquatic species"
used for production purposes, or animals used for the "purpose of
providing food for human or animal consumption."2 3 While chapter
14 does not define "livestock" or "poultry," other parts of the North
Carolina General Statutes do. Section 68-15 defines the term
"livestock" as follows: "The word 'livestock' in this Chapter shall
include, but shall not be limited to, equine animals, bovine animals,
sheep, goats, llamas, and swine."" Section 106-549.51 defines
"poultry" as "any domesticated bird, whether live or dead. ' 25
Therefore, these statutes exempt from protection agricultural
animals. Cattle and pigs are exempted under the "livestock"
definition, as they are "bovine animals" and "swine" respectively, and
chickens are exempted under the "poultry" definition.2 6 Both
definitions are broadly defined, and the definition of "livestock" is
open ended: any other animal used in food production may be
exempted under these terms.

21. Susie's Law increased the punishment for torturing, cruelly beating, maiming,
mutilating, poisoning, or killing an animal to a Class H felony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14360(b) (2011); see also SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, FELONY
PUNISHMENT CHART, MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SENTENCES, availableat http://www

.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/felonychartR 12 01_09minmaxsen
tences.pdf (effective for offenses committed on or after Dec. 1, 2009); Bowens, supra note
13 (noting how Susie's Law toughens penalties for animal cruelty).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c) (2011).
23. Id.

24. § 68-15.
25. § 106-549.51.
26. "Bovine" is defined as "having qualities ... characteristic of oxen or cows,"
"poultry" is defined as "domesticated birds kept for eggs or meat," and "swine" is defined
as "any of various stout-bodied short-legged omnivorous artiodactyl mammals ... with a
thick bristly skin and a long flexible snout," especially "a domesticated one descended
from the wild boar." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 147, 972, 1264
(11th ed. 2003).
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The enactment of Susie's Law exemplifies a phenomenon that is
occurring throughout the country. Although some citizens of North
Carolina were outraged by Susie's treatment, North Carolina
continues to support a thriving hog industry, 7 a stable cattle
industry,2" and a growing poultry industry. 29 Agricultural animals face
conditions as bad as, or worse than, those that Susie suffered on a
daily basis.30 The legislature, however, did not address the situation of
these animals when it added protection for companion animals. While
policymakers may see a great difference between companion and
agricultural animals that justifies varying treatment, this Comment
31
will argue that the differences are, in fact, quite minimal. The
disparity in treatment and opinion of these separate groups of animals
is clearly reflected in the law. While companion animals are gaining a
more protected status, agricultural animals are losing almost all
protection under the law.

II.

PROGRESSION OF LAWS OVER TIME

To understand the disparity in legal protection between
companion and agricultural animals, it is important to understand the
progression of animal law as a legal doctrine. This Part will survey the
evolution of American animal law from the early colonial law period
onward. Early law provided relatively few protections for either
group of animals. Beginning with basic protections for commercially
valuable animals, animal law steadily developed an increasing
concern with protecting animals for the animals' sake.

27. Agriculture & Food: Animal Agriculture, N.C. Coop. EXTENSION, http://www.ces

.ncsu.edu/index.php?page=animalagriculture (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("Today, animal
agriculture accounts for about 60 percent of ... [North Carolina's] total farm cash
receipts."); Hog Farming,N.C. & THE GLOBAL ECON., http://www.duke.edu/web/mmsl90
/hogfarming/ (last updated Apr. 28, 2004) ("North Carolina is the second leading hog
producer in the United States, behind Iowa, with a hog population of over 10 million.").
28. Agricultural Overview-Commodities, N.C. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER

SERVS., http://www.ncagr.gov/stats/general/commodities.htm (last updated July 27, 2007)
("North Carolina's number of cattle ... [and] calves on farms has remained relatively
stable throughout time.").
29. Id. ("Unlike other commodities, broiler [chicken] production in North Carolina is
increasing throughout the state."); see also NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK, DAIRY AND POULTRY: NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL

STATISTICS 38-42 (2010), availableat http://www.ncagr.gov/stats/2010AgStatPage037_056
.pdf (giving statistics on all livestock and poultry production in North Carolina).
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See infra Part IV.A.
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ColonialLaw

In the early seventeenth century, animals were legally protected
because they were seen as property.3 2 Protection of the animal was a
safeguard of the owner's property, rather than a protection of the
animal herself.33 One of the first laws to exemplify this way of
thinking was the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, a code of law
enacted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641.34 Liberties 92 and
93, under the section "Of the Bruite Creatures," are claimed to be the
first anti-cruelty laws for animals. 35 They read:
92 No man shall exercise any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any
bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man's use.
93 If any man shall have occasion to leade or drive Cattel from
place to place that is far of, so that they be weary, or hungry, or
fall sick, or lambe, It shall be lawful to rest or refresh them, for
a competent time, in any open place that is not Come, meadow,
or inclosed for some peculiar use.36
These laws show the early rationale of animal anti-cruelty laws.
Liberty 92 was not meant to protect animals for their own sake, but
rather to protect the property of a human, i.e., animals "usuallie kept
for man's use." This law would protect cattle and horses, since they
were usually used for food, plowing, riding, pulling carriages, and
such activities, but it would certainly not protect a cat. Similarly,
Liberty 93 provides a special protection for cattle that allowed a man
leading or driving cattle a long distance to stop and allow the animals
to rest on any open land, excluding only cornfields, meadows, and
land enclosed for "some peculiar use."37 The purpose of this law was
not to prevent the suffering of the cattle, but rather it was meant to
keep the property of the man alive. 38 Both Liberties applied only to
animals used by humans, not ownerless or stray animals.39 Liberty 93
did not provide that a stray, wandering cow might stop on someone's
32. DAVID S. FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND

(2008).
33. See

RIGHTS 204

SIMON BROOMAN & DEBBIE LEGGE, LAW RELATING TO ANIMALS 50

(1997); FAVRE, supra note 32, at 204.
34. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 303 n.36 (2002).
35. Id.; MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES 1 92-93 (1641), reprinted in WILLIAM H.
WHITMORE, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS

COLONY FROM 1630 TO 1686, at 53 (1890).
36. MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES, supra note 35, 1 93.

37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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land to rest; Liberty 93 only provided that a human driving or leading
cattle could stop on another's land." Therefore, while the law did
benefit some animals, it did not do so with the intention of increasing
animal protection. 1 Both provisions were meant to protect the
property of humans.42
In 1846, Vermont enacted a similar law:
Every person who shall willfully and maliciously kill, wound,
maim or disfigure any horse, or horses, or horse kind, cattle,
sheep, or swine, of another person, or shall willfully or
maliciously administer poison to any such animal ...shall be
punished by imprisonment [of] ... not more than five years, or
fined not exceeding five hundred dollars.43
This law protected "commercially valuable animals, not pets or wild
animals,"" and the injury had to be caused by someone other than
the owner.45 Again, the law protected the animal because it protected
the property of the owner.46 The owner could dispose of or do what
he wished with his property. 47 The law was not meant to prevent the
suffering of animals. 48 Rather, the law protected animals that were
used as tools, such as cattle for farmers. Thus, the first animals legally
protected in the United States were commercially valuable animals,
like livestock, rather than companion animals, like dogs and cats.
In some other early laws, animal cruelty was outlawed as a means
of protecting against the demoralization of humans, rather than
protecting animals for the animals' own sake. 49 An early example of
this is the Gaming Act of 1664, enacted by the British Parliament and
imposed in the Maryland Colony.5" This Act against "deceitful,
disorderly, and excessive [g]aming" prevented gambling on cock
fights, horse races, and dog fights, among other activities." If one
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id.
See id.
See id.
1846 Vt.Acts & Resolves 35, 35, as reprintedin FAVRE, supra note 32, at 205.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 205.

45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.

49. See Christine Stevens & Diane Halverson, Fightingand Baiting, in ANIMALS AND
THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS 151,154 (4th ed. 1990).

50. See Gaming Act, 1664, 16 Car. 2, c. 7, reprinted in 2 JULIAN J. ALEXANDER,
643-46 (Ward Baldwin Coe ed., M.
Curlander Law Publisher, 2d ed. 1912) (1870), available at http://www.animalrightshistory
.org/animal-rights-law/enlightenment-legislation/1664-uk-act-gaming.htm.
51. Id. at 644.

BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND
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gambled and won something in either a cock fight, a horse race, or a
dog fight, then the winner forfeited three times the amount of the
winnings.52 Thus, the Act did not necessarily criminalize these uses of
animals, but rather prohibited a morally unacceptable activity at these
events-gambling. The Act stated the reason for its regulation was
the idea that activities such as animal races and fights should be used
for recreation only, and not for one's trade.5 3 In other words, the
problem with these activities was entirely based on gambling, not the
treatment of animals.54 According to the Act's authors, gambling
engenders disorderly and dishonest gamblers, who deceive others,
waste time, and ruin their estates and fortunes.55 While the law
unintentionally provided some protection to animals-decreasing the
prevalence of animal fights and races-the purpose of the Act was to
better the human race, not prevent any animal suffering.
During the nineteenth century, "lawmakers began to recognize
that an animal's potential for pain and suffering was real and
deserving of protection against its unnecessary infliction."5 6 Maine
passed a statute that read:
[I]f any person shall cruelly beat any horse or cattle, and be
thereof convicted,... he shall be punished by fine not less than
two dollars nor more than five dollars, or by imprisonment in
thirty days,
the common gaol for a term not exceeding
57
according to the aggravation of the offence.
Again, this law was meant to protect animals of commercial value,
like cattle and horses, rather than the animals now considered pets.
This law, however, was more progressive than other early laws in
denying immunity to the owner of the animal.5 8 Under early laws, like
the Vermont law discussed above, a person was only guilty if he killed
or injured an animal belonging to another person. 9 Here, on the
other hand, anyone who "cruelly beat[s] any horse or cattle,"
regardless of ownership, was subject to liability.6" While "cruelly" set
a fairly high standard,6 1 this showed a concern not purely for

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 643.
See id. at 643-46.
See id.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 204.
1821 Me. Laws 55, 57-58, as reprintedin FAVRE, supra note 32, at 206.
See FAVRE, supra note 32, at 206.
See 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves 35, 35, as reprintedin FAVRE, supranote 32, at 205.
Id.
See id.
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protecting the owner's property interest in the animal, but also for
protecting the animal for her own sake.
In 1822, the courts in New York ruled "that wanton cruelty to an
animal ...[w]as a misdemeanor at common law."'6 2 Cruelty against
domestic animals was outlawed in New York in 1828, in Washington
in 1859, in California in 1868, and in Florida in 1889.63 These early
anti-cruelty laws, however, were still often promulgated for human
benefit, as many people believed that cruelty to animals might lead to
cruelty against humans.' The concern of the laws, therefore, "was for
human actor, rather than the suffering of the
the moral state of the
65
nonhuman animal.,
As mentioned above, the law remained concerned with
protecting animals that were owned and used by humans: only those
value.' Therefore, it was not yet illegal to
animals with commercial
67
cat.
a
or
dog
a
torture
For example, in an 1856 case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that a statute making it a crime for anyone to "willfully and
maliciously kill, maim or disfigure any horses, cattle, or other beasts
of another person" did not apply to dogs. 68 The court stated, "The
term beasts may well be intended to include asses, mules, sheep,
swine, and, perhaps, some other domesticated animals, but it would
be going quite too far to hold that dogs were intended.1 69 What the
Minnesota case makes clear is that while nineteenth century animal
law had progressed enough to prevent cruel abuse to commercially
valuable animals, legislative and judicial bodies were still not
concerned with the welfare of animals, but instead were focused on
the animals' value to humans. Cattle, which today enjoy little to no
protection,7° were given some minimal protection by the laws since
they had commercial value.71
62. GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 7 (1996); see The Stage Horse Cases, 15 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 51,
63 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1873).
63. BROOMAN & LEGGE, supra note 33, at 50.
64. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 208.
65. Id.
66. See United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 226, 229 (1856) (excluding dogs from a list of
"domesticated animals" protected under an animal anti-cruelty statute-thus implying
dogs, unlike animals used in agriculture, were not valued enough to deserve protection).
67. See FAVRE, supra note 32, at 207.
68. Gideon, 1 Minn. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
70. See infra Part III.B-C.
71. The laws show that animals that could provide revenue agriculturally-such as
horses, cows, donkeys, mules, sheep, and pigs-were given protection against animal
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As with today's body of animal law, during the nineteenth
century there was a disparity in the protection of animals. Those
animals that now receive the most protection-companion animalsreceived little to no protection from cruelty, while livestock animals
were valued enough to maintain a basic level of protection. It would
be difficult to conclude that there is some inherent trait in dogs and
cats that has always made them worthy of legal protection, while the
intrinsic qualities of agricultural animals have always made them
unworthy of basic protection. Thus, at first glance, animal protection
laws, including Susie's Law, seem arbitrary.
B. The Bergh Era
Henry Bergh's influence, which began around 1866,72 led to laws
that provided protection for animals based on their own value as
living, sentient beings, rather than merely their value as property.73
Bergh was born in New York City in 1813. 74 In the 1840s, he and his
wife traveled through Europe.75 While in Spain, Bergh noted a cart
driver whose voice "filled his horse with terror."76 In Greece, he
wrote that the horses were treated even worse than in Spain, being
struck by their drivers when not moving fast enough.77 After
witnessing a bullfight in Seville, Bergh "was so upset by what he saw
that he wrote a letter to a New York newspaper ... [protesting] ...

the slaughter of the bullring." 78
In 1865, Bergh observed the work of the Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("RSPCA") during a visit to
England.79 After spending several weeks interacting with Lord

cruelty. See 1821 Me. Laws ch. IV, § 7, as reprinted in MAINE, LAWS OF THE STATE OF

MAINE 57-58 (Hallowell, Calvin Spaulding 1822); 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves 35, 35, as
reprintedin FAVRE, supra note 32, at 205; Gideon, 1 Minn. at 229. On the other hand, dogs
and cats are consistently excluded from early laws. See Gideon, 1 Minn. at 229; see also
Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456, 459 (1881) (suggesting that the judicial system does not have
time to prosecute everyone who drowns a litter of kittens). One of the earliest anti-cruelty
laws concerning dogs only protected dogs with commercial value, i.e., dogs that could pull
loads. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 211.
72. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 208.
73. Id. at 211 ("The focus of social concern was on the animals themselves.").
74. JOHN J. LOEPER, CRUSADE FOR KINDNESS: HENRY BERGH AND THE ASPCA 7
(1991).
75. See id. at 11.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Id. at 17.
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Harrowby, president of the RSPCA,8' Bergh returned to the United
States and focused his efforts in the New York Legislature to
minimize animal cruelty.81 He successfully obtained a charter from
the New York Legislature for the creation of the American Society
("ASPCA"), 2 an animal
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
83
today.
exists
interest organization that still
An early animal anti-cruelty statute in New York prohibited the
killing, maiming, or wounding of "any horse, ox or other cattle, or any
sheep, belonging to another."84 Bergh was able to influence the
legislature to modify this act to include "any living creature," rather
than just those animals of commercial value.8 5 This act brought
today's companion animals under the protection of the law. Bergh
also successfully pushed for legislation requiring the registration of
dogs used by businesses to pull loads, 6 thus further including today's
companion animals under the law. Until this time, animals with
commercial value, such as livestock, received the most, if not the only,
protection-in contrast to today, where, although there appears to be
more animal protection overall, agricultural animals suffer from less
protection.87 Thus, this was the beginning of a shift in animal
protection.
Several cases exemplify the changes that occurred during the
Bergh era. In Grise v. State,88 the issue was whether the defendant had
violated a statute that made it a misdemeanor to needlessly kill or
mutilate an animal when he struck and killed a neighbor's hog that
was on his land.89 While the statute at issue was progressive in that it
protected all animals, the Supreme Court of Arkansas was not as
forward-thinking. The court stated that upholding a literal
construction of the statute would lead to absurdities: "Society, for
instance, could not long tolerate a system of laws, which might drag to
the criminal bar, every lady who might impale a butterfly, or every

80. Id.
81. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 208-09; LOEPER, supra note 74, at 17-19.
82. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 209; LOEPER, supra note 74, at 19.
83.

See AM. SOC'Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,

http://www

.aspca.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
84. N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 26 (1836), as reprinted in FAVRE, supra note
32, at 207.

85. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 210.
86. Id. at 211.
87. See infra Part III.B-C.

88. 37 Ark. 456 (1881).
89. Id. at 456.
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man who might drown a litter of kittens .... "90 The court's tone
shows that, despite the law's attempt to be progressive in its concern
for animals, the thinking of the time had still not caught up to this
view, and the judiciary was unwilling to apply this philosophy. Cats,
which are among the most protected animals today,91 were not seen
by this court as deserving protection since they had no commercial
value.' While the law might have attempted to protect cats, the court
showed that commercial value to humans still played a large role in
determining which animals should be protected.
As the law began to expand to other domestic but less
commercially valuable animals, the focus shifted slightly to include
the suffering of the animal rather than merely the financial detriment
to the owner. In Horton v. State,9 3 the defendant was convicted of
"cruelly killing a dog" for shooting him with a rifle.94 The statute at
issue forbade a person from "cruelly kill[ing]" an animal.95 The
Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the conviction since the statute
only prevented cruel killings, not mere killings, and the court did not
believe that the defendant's actions had risen to this level.96 The court
stated that it could not hold a mere killing to be cruelly done because,
if it were to do so, "then he who kills his pig, or ox, for the market,
would fall within the letter of the law, and no exception being made in
the statute as to the purpose of the killing, we must eat no more
meat."9 7 The court recognized, however, that the statute was for the
"prevention of cruelty to the animal itself," not for "any offense
against the owner of the property."9 8 This recognition was a
significant advancement in animal law since the focus was not entirely
on the human owner.
The shift from laws protecting human property to laws focusing
on animal suffering remained narrow during the time of Bergh,
focusing on pain rather than death, but allowing pain if it could be

90. Id. at 459.
91. See infra Part III.A (outlining modern developments which heightened the legal
status of companion animals, including cats).
92. See Grise, 37 Ark. at 459; United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 226, 230 (1856) (noting
that animals not serving as food lacked intrinsic value under the law).
93. 27 So. 468 (Ala. 1900).
94. Id. at 468. The Horton court did not specify the dog's sex, but this Comment will
refer to animals with gendered pronouns, rather than "it."
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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deemed necessary. In State v. Roche,' defendants were charged with
"unlawfully, wilfully and cruelly overdriving a horse," resulting in his
death."° The St. Louis Court of Appeals overturned the conviction,
holding that the overdriving of the horse had to be "willful" and
noting that merely killing the horse by overdriving was not sufficient
to show that the overdriving was willful.1"' While this case again
shows some concern for animals, it also shows the very limited scope
of animal protection at the time. The statute in Roche may again
suggest that the legislative reasoning behind the law was to protect
the humanity and "decency" of humans by preventing them from
doing acts that would seem unnecessarily cruel rather than to protect
the animal from unnecessarily cruel acts.
The Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire in State v.
Avery,"° in which a defendant was charged with "willfully,
maliciously and cruelly beat[ing] and wound[ing]" his own horse, 10 3
clearly stated the general thoughts of this era. The court noted that
the anti-cruelty statute was "founded upon a high moral principle,
which denounces the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, even
upon animals created for the use of man, as contrary alike to the
principles of Christianity and the spirit of the age.' Thus, the court
believed that cruelty should be prevented not for the sake of the
animals, but in order to uphold a higher Christian principle.
The court further stated that chastisement of animals as
necessary for training or discipline, and if done in good faith and for a
proper purpose, is not necessarily malicious even if it is excessive.10 5
Instead, the court explained, a person should only be prosecuted if
the excessive infliction of pain is done in a "malevolent spirit, and not
by any justifiable motive.""0 6 Therefore, animals could still be beaten,
even excessively, so long as there was a proper purpose for the
beating, such as "training or discipline."'0 7 While all domesticated
animals, including those originally not protected, such as dogs, were
beginning to come under the protective scope of the law, the
protection remained minimal. Human purposes were still placed

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

37 Mo. App. 480 (1889).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 482.
44 N.H. 392 (1862).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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above animal suffering, thereby allowing an exception to essentially
all, if not actually all, forms of animal abuse.
C. Modern Cases
Recent cases have increased the focus on the suffering of animals
themselves. The exceptions to animal cruelty laws have become fewer
and, in some cases, even nonexistent. In People v. Voelker, 10 8 where
the defendant cut the heads off of three live and conscious iguanas,
the Criminal Court of New York stated, "[I1t is clear that the
justification for killing or torturing the animals must be of the type
necessary to preserve the safety of property or to overcome danger or
injury."109 While previously the law allowed broad justifications for
animal cruelty, such as the incredibly malleable "training or
discipline" exception in Avery, 10 the Voelker decision was an
advancement in animal law in that animal cruelty is only justified if
done to protect property or overcome danger or injury."'
In Aaroe v. State,"' the District Court of Appeals of Florida
upheld the felony conviction of a defendant who shot a cat, Smokey,
that had crawled under the defendant's trailer and excited his dogs." 3
The statute in Aaroe made it illegal to "intentionally commit[] an act
to any animal which results in the cruel death, or excessive or
repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, or causes the
same to be done."' 14 In stark contrast to previous court decisions, the
Aaroe court upheld the defendant's conviction for shooting a cat," 5
an act which not only lacked the cruelty required in Roche or
Avery, 1 6 but also an act that the court in Grise found beyond
protection." 7 Notably, the punishment for this crime was
imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of not more than $10,000, or
both." 8 This case highlights the large difference between the views
held by nineteenth century and twenty-first century courts on the
legal protection of animals.

108. 658 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Crim. Ct. 1997).
109. Id. at 181, 183.
110. See Avery, 44 N.H. at 396.
111. Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
112. 788 So. 2d 340 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
113. Id. at 341.
114. Id. at 341 n.1.
115. Id. at 341.
116. See State v. Roche, 37 Mo. App. 480, 481-82 (1889); State v. Avery, 44 N.H. 393,
396 (1862).
117. See Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456, 459 (1881).
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12(2) (West 2006); Aaroe, 788 So. 2d at 341 n.1.
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The wording of the statute in Aaroe applies to "any animal,"' 1 9
illustrating the progression away from protecting only commercially
valuable animals. While the statute still requires that the act be
intentional and that a death be a "cruel death," "cruel" does not
modify the "excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or
suffering. '"120 This contrasts with the statute in Avery in which
"willfully and maliciously" modified "kill, maim, wound, poison, or
disfigure. '12 This also differs from the statute in Roche in which
"unlawfully, willfully and cruelly" modified "overdriving a horse."1 22
The court in Aaroe did not say under which provision the defendant
was convicted; however, the "cruel death" provision can be ruled out
since Smokey did not die, as can the "repeated infliction of pain or
suffering provision," as Smokey was only shot once. 123 It is likely that
the court upheld this conviction under the excessive infliction of pain
or suffering provision.'24 It is unlikely that a nineteenth or even early
twentieth century court would have found a single, non-fatal shot to a
cat to be "excessive. "125 The fact that a single, non-fatal shot to a cat
could be called "excessive" and was worthy of punishment of up to
five years in prison or a $10,000 fine speaks strongly to the
advancement of animal law from a century earlier.
The greatest change in modern animal anti-cruelty laws is that
the laws sometimes allow animal suffering to outweigh human
interests, at least for companion animals. In Elisea v. State, 26 the
Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a defendant who
cropped two puppies' ears without anesthesia and left the wounds
unbound and unsutured. 127 The court allowed a veterinarian to testify
as to the pain that the puppies likely felt, thereafter holding that the
defendant's actions were prohibited by a statute preventing the
"torture" or "mutilation" of animals.'2 8 This case shows the
advancement in animal law: although there might have been sufficient
human purpose to justify the cropping of puppies' ears under
119. Aaroe, 788 So. 2d at 341 n.1.
120. Id.
121. Avery, 44 N.H. at 394.
122. State v. Roche, 37 Mo. App. 480, 481 (1889).
123. See Aaroe, 788 So. 2d at 341.
124. See id.
125. Compare Avery, 44 N.H. at 396 (allowing excessive infliction of pain unless it was
also malicious), with State v. Horton, 27 So. 468, 468 (Ala. 1900) (holding that a single shot
that killed a dog did not rise to the level of a cruel killing and thus should not be
punishable).
126. 777 N.E.2d 46 (Ind.Ct. App. 2002).
127. Id. at47.
128. Id. at 48.
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Avery, 129 the Elisea court felt that the animals' interest outweighed
the human interest.
Further, the court considered the pain that the puppies felt and
even allowed testimony on the subject. 3 ' While courts during the
Bergh era began to consider animal suffering, the suffering could be
outweighed by a human purpose. Another important aspect of the
Elisea case was the sentence given: a one-year jail sentence.131 An
active jail sentence for animal abuse demonstrates that modern laws
consider animal abuse to be a much more serious crime than their
nineteenth century predecessors.
State v. Witham'32 demonstrates an even further advancement of
modern animal law. In Witham, the defendant purposefully ran over
his girlfriend's pregnant cat. 133 The Maine Supreme Court upheld his
conviction under a statute making it aggravated animal cruelty to
"intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" cause "extreme physical pain
to an animal," cause "the death of an animal," or "[p]hysically
torture[] an animal. ' 134 Unlike previous laws that required that a
human's act of abuse toward an animal be intentional or even cruel,
this statute allows conviction even if the act is done recklessly and not
intentionally.' 35 The wording of this statute greatly broadens the
scope of what constitutes animal abuse by including even reckless
acts. This change represents a notable advancement in modern animal
law.
If an anti-cruelty statute has an intent requirement, the majority
rule, as stated in People v. Alvarado,136 is that the modifiers
"willfully," "knowingly," "intentionally," and "maliciously" refer to
general, not specific, intent crimes.'37 The Alvarado court explained
that, as a rule, "intentionally" only requires that a defendant intend to
do the act that is prohibited and not that the defendant know that the
act is prohibited.13 8 Accordingly, one who violates an animal abuse
statute in a majority rule jurisdiction, such as a statute preventing the

129. See Avery, 44 N.H. at 396.
130. Elisea,777 N.E.2d at 48.
131. Id. at 51.
132. 2005 ME 79,876 A.2d 40.
133. Id. 3, 876 A.2d at 41.
134. Id. 5, 876 A.2d at 41-42 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 1031(1-B) (Supp.
2003)).
135. See tit. 17, § 1031(1-B).
136. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 391 (Ct. App. 2005).
137. Id. at 396.
138. Id. (quoting People v. Ramsey, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 308 (Ct. App. 2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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torture of an animal, must not be found to have intended to torture
the animal, but rather must have only intended to act in the way that
he acted. 139 While modifying an animal abuse statute with
"intentionally" limits the scope of who may qualify as an offender,
this is not a substantial limitation on the statute.
Thus, the trend in modern animal law is toward increased
protection. There is a greater focus on the suffering of the animal
involved. Also, there are fewer exceptions that allow a defendant to
justify his cruel acts toward an animal. In interpreting a statutory
requirement of intent, most courts will find that the only intent
required is that the defendant intended to do the act that he
committed. Now, animal law's purpose is to protect the animal, rather
than merely to benefit mankind in a way that tangentially results in
protecting the animal. 4 Commercial value is less of a consideration
than it was under common law: any "animal," with prescribed
exceptions, is protected under most anti-cruelty statutes, including
under Susie's Law.14 As will be discussed below, however, the laws
have exempted some animals from this increased protection. This has
led to the gaping disparity between companion and agricultural
animals.
III. CURRENT DIVISION OF THE LAWS

While the previous Part detailed the advances in animal law, this
Part will discuss how, although animal anti-cruelty statutes as a whole
have become more protective, not all animals have benefited equally
from this increase in protection. Companion animals, such as dogs
and cats, have steadily gained more protection, but agricultural
animals, such as cattle, chickens, and pigs, have lost almost all
protection under the law.
A.

CompanionAnimals

The recent update to North Carolina's animal cruelty law, Susie's
Law, exemplifies the current trend in animal law as a whole.'4 2 Susie's
Law makes intentional starvation of an animal a felony 43 and
increases the punishment for torturing, beating, maiming, mutilating,

139. See, e.g., id. at 398.
140. See supra Part II.C.
141. See supra Part II.C.; see also supra Part I (exploring Susie's Law in detail and its
effect on animal protection).
142. See supra Part I.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(al) (2011).
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poisoning, or killing an animal to a higher class of felonies.1 "
However, even after the enactment of Susie's Law, agricultural
excluded from North Carolina's definition of
animals ' remain
"animal. 145 While dogs, cats, and other pets are able to benefit from
the law, cows, pigs, and chickens-animals of commercial value that
in earlier times would have received more protection than dogs or
cats-receive no benefit at all from the statute.

Companion animals are moving toward a status of more than
mere property. A New York court overruled prior precedent in 1979
and held that "a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place
1' 46
somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property.'
Notably, the court referred to a "pet," rather than an "animal," thus
giving companion animals a special legal status. 147 Similarly, in the
Texas case Bueckner v. Hamel,148 Justice Andell stated in his
concurring opinion that a dog worth only ten dollars on the market
could be "a highly valued companion whose loss would be deeply
felt" and that "[p]eople who love and care for animals should not be
forced to accept as compensation for their loss the amount that the
animal would bring in the market.' 49 In determining the value of a
dog for legal purposes, Justice Andell stated the "true rule" is that the
dog's value "may be either a market value, if the dog has any, or some
special or pecuniary value to the owner, which may be ascertained by
reference to the usefulness and services of the dog." 5 '
While market value is still the main way courts determine
damages for injury or death of companion animals,"' some courts, in
line with Justice Andell's concurring opinion, have found that harm
to pets justifies additional damages. For example, a California jury
awarded a dog owner $39,000 in damages, $30,000 of which was given
for the "intrinsic" or "special value" of the dog.' 52
144. § 14-360(b).
145. § 14-360(c)(2)-(2a); see supra Part 1.
146. Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Civ. Ct. 1979).
147. Id.
148. 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1994).
149. Id. at 374 (Andell, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 375 (quoting Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Justice Andell went on to state that, due to their characteristics,
he considers animals to "belong to a unique category of 'property' that neither statutory
law nor caselaw has yet recognized," and that the "law should reflect society's recognition
that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing companionship
to the humans with whom they live." Id. at 377-78.
151. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 138.
152. R. Scott Nolen, CaliforniaDog Owner Awarded $39,000 in Veterinary Malpractice
Suit, J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N NEWS (Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.avma.org
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Although still slight, there is more willingness by the courts to
award damages for the mental pain and suffering of pet owners whose
pets have been harmed. The Third Circuit, in Brown v. Muhlenberg
Township, 5' held that an emotional distress claim for injury to a pet
could, in fact, succeed in certain circumstances, such as "where it is
shown that a police officer's attention was called to the severe
emotional distress of the pet's owner, he hesitated before shooting,
and he then attempted to fire five bullets into the pet within the
owner's view and without justification.1' 54 While relatively few courts
have taken this stance on emotional distress claims, this holding is a
step forward in recognizing animal rights.'55
A few courts also allow damages for the mental pain and
suffering that comes from the loss of a pet's companionship. 56 These
claims often succeed at the trial level but are generally reversed on
appeal.'57 In Brousseau v. Rosenthal,'58 when the plaintiff's dog died
without justification at the defendant's kennel, the court ordered
damages for the plaintiff, taking into consideration both loss of
companionship and loss of protective value of the dog, a mutt and a
gift.'59 In making its decision, the court stated: "Resisting the
temptation to romanticize the virtues of a 'human's best friend,' it
would be wrong not to acknowledge the companionship and
protection that Ms. Brousseau lost with the death of her canine
companion of eight years."' 160
Additionally, a Seattle district court judge ordered a defendant,
whose dog had fatally mauled the plaintiff's cat, to pay the plaintiff
$45,480, including "$30,000 for the loss of the cat and $15,000 for
emotional distress.""'' While damages for loss of companionship and
emotional distress are still not the norm in animal cruelty cases, they

/onlnews/javma/apr04/040415e.asp.
153. 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 218-19.
155. See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985);
Katsaris v. Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 538 (Ct. App. 1986); LaPorte v. Associated Indeps.,
Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985); City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Nelson v. Percy,
540 A.2d 1035, 1036 (Vt. 1987).
156. See FAVRE, supra note 32, at 156.
157. Id. at 157.
158. 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
159. Id. at 286.
160. Id. at 286-87.
161. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 157; see Warren Cornwall & Craig Welch, Judge Awards
$45,480 in Cat's Death, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2005, at Al.
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are occasionally allowed, showing the advancements for companion
animals under the law.
Further, as evidenced by Susie's Law and in state actions, such as
Alabama's sentencing of Juan Daniels to nine years in prison for
torturing a dog,162 courts and legislatures are becoming more willing
to give prison sentences for harming pets. Companion animals seem
to be moving toward a status of "Living Property, which consists of
property that can possess defined legal rights of their own."' 6 3 In
contrast, the first conviction for animal abuse to an agricultural

animal on a factory farm did not occur until 1999,164 and there have
been incredibly few convictions since that time, despite vast evidence
65

of abuse. 1
Companion animals have reached a point where humans have
legal responsibilities for them. For example, there is often a duty of
care that attaches to animals, such that the owner must provide a
basic level of care. For example, a Minnesota statute states that "[n]o
person shall deprive any animal over which the person has charge or
control of necessary food, water, or shelter."' 166 However, these duty
of care statutes also often have exemptions for agricultural practices.
For example, Michigan requires that an "owner, possessor, or person
having the charge or custody of an animal shall" provide the animal
with "adequate care," which means "sufficient food, water, shelter,
sanitary conditions, exercise, and veterinary medical attention in
order to maintain an animal in a state of good health.' ' 167 These
provisions do not apply, however, to "[f]arming or a generally

162. Desmond Wingard, Parole Denied for Juan Daniels, WSFA (Aug. 24, 2010, 1:51
PM), http://www.wsfa.com/global/story.asp?s=13034762.
163. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 431.
164. The first felony indictments for cruelty to agricultural animals, which were later
dropped to misdemeanors, were issued in 1999 based on video footage of farm workers
beating pregnant sows, skinning a pig alive, and cutting off a conscious pig's leg. See Hogs
Mutilated and Beaten, PET-ABUSE.CoM, http://www.pet-abuse.com/cases/3001/NC/US/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Investigation of North Carolina Pig Farm Results in Historic
Felony Cruelty Convictions, PETA (Apr. 2000), http://www.peta.org/about/victories
/Investigation-of-North-Carolina-Pig-Farm-Results-in-Historic-Felony-CrueltyConvictions.aspx. The first charges of animal cruelty to agricultural birds came in 2008
based on allegations of "stomping on turkeys, punching them, beating them with pipes and
boards, and twisting the birds' necks repeatedly," and even "shoving a broomstick down a
turkey's throat." RaeLeann Smith, Factory-FarmWorkers Face First-Ever Felony Cruelty
Charges,ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.britannica.com
/blogst2009/02/factory-farm-workers-face-first-ever-felony-cruelty-charges/.
165. See infra Part III.C.
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 343.21(2) (West 2004).
167. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.50(1)(a), (2)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
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accepted animal husbandry or farming practice involving
'
livestock."168
There may also be a duty to provide veterinary care to
companion animals. In State v. Dresbach, 69 the Ohio Court of
Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction for not providing
veterinary care to a dog with hookworms under a statute providing
that no person shall "[t]orture an animal, deprive one of necessary
sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, needlessly mutilate or kill,
or impound or confine an animal without supplying it during such
confinement with a sufficient quantity of good wholesome food and
water."' 70 While the duty to provide veterinary care is not clearly
stated in the statute, the court read the definition of "torture" in the
" ' The definition being
act to include a duty to provide such care.17
"every act, omission, or neglect by which unnecessary or unjustifiable
pain or suffering is caused, permitted, or allowed to continue, when
there is a reasonable remedy or relief.""' Under the court's
reasoning, an owner would be guilty of torturing an animal in
"situations where an animal suffers needlessly because of the owner's
failure to seek critically necessary veterinary care, if such care
'
There is still, however, a split
represents a reasonable remedy."173
among courts concerning the duty to provide veterinary care. 74
The duty to provide care to animals also prevents animal
hoarding. Illinois was one of the first states to add hoarding to its
animal cruelty law.'75 The Illinois statute defines a "companion
animal hoarder" as a person possessing "a large number of
168.
169.
170.
at 515.
171.

§ 750.50(11)(f) (West Supp. 2011).
702 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.13(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010); Dresbach,702 N.E.2d
Dresbach, 702 N.E.2d at 516.

172. § 1717.01(B).

173. Dresbach,702 N.E.2d at 516.
174. See People v. Sanchez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 448 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The fact
[defendant] never saw the chow attack the puppy does not negate the gravamen of the
offense that he was aware the puppy was injured and did nothing to treat its wounds.");
People v. Olary, 170 N.W.2d 842, 843-44 (Mich. 1969) (holding that a farmer's failure to
provide medical care to his injured cattle, even if he did not cause the injury, was sufficient
to support a finding of cruelty under an animal anti-cruelty statute); People v. Mahoney,
804 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that a jury charge defining sustenance to
include veterinary care and adequate shelter to maintain the dog's health and comfort
properly conveyed the appropriate law). But see People v. Arroyo, 777 N.Y.S.2d 836, 84247 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (holding that a statute requiring the provision of "necessary
sustenance" to an animal was unconstitutionally vague and did not give notice that a pet
owner must provide veterinary care to a terminally ill animal).
175. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 284.
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companion animals ... [who] fails to or is unable to provide what he
or she is required to provide ... [and who] keeps the companion
animals in a severely overcrowded environment." 7' 6 Further, the
animal hoarder must "display[] an inability to recognize or
understand the nature of or ha[ve] a reckless disregard for the
conditions under which the companion animals are living and the
deleterious impact they have on the companion animals' and owner's

health and well-being." 177
The statute anticipates that a companion animal hoarder will
violate Section 3 of Illinois's Humane Care for Animals Act, 178 which
includes such categories as "Owner's Duties," "Cruel Treatment,"
and "Aggravated Cruelty."' 79 Further, under each of these three
categories, the Act states that if the convicted person is a companion
animal hoarder, then "the court must order the convicted person to
undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to undergo
treatment that the court determines to be appropriate after due
consideration of the evaluation."' 80 Thus, the law here shows a
concern with protecting animals from cruel conditions, even if the
owner does not have the intent to harm the animals but merely has an
"inability to recognize or understand the nature of" the situation. 8 '
Hoarders often claim to love their animals, 82 arguing that they
are just trying to take care of them. Laws against hoarding, then, set a
fairly high standard of animal care, since they eliminate the intent
requirement and put animal interests above a potentially meaningful
human interest. This advancement in the law is only for companion
animals. For example, the Illinois law refers to a companion animal
hoarder, excluding all non-companion animals. 83
There is one situation, however, in which a form of companion
animal hoarding is allowed-puppy mills. "A puppy mill is usually a
small business, perhaps a family business, where the goal of selling
puppies dominates and the care for the breeding mothers as well as
the puppies becomes secondary."'" In State v. Johnson,' for
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2.10 (West 2004).
Id.
See id.
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 to 3.02 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
Id.
See id. at 70/2.10.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 283.
See 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2.10.
184. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 265.
185. State v. Johnson, No. W2001-01272-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26,
2002), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca/PDF/022
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example, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a
conviction of eleven counts of animal cruelty against husband and
wife defendants who owned and operated a puppy mill with
approximately 350 dogs.186 Each of the eleven counts charged that the
defendants "did unlawfully and knowingly confine an animal in a
cruel manner and did unreasonably fail to provide necessary care for
an animal in their custody," a violation of the Tennessee Code."8 In
discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted that the
defendants had "in excess of 350 dogs on their premises," all living in
"filthy and unsanitary" conditions, with "[p]oor, or nonexistent,
means of cooling or even circulating the air," which created a foul,
ammonia-like smell. 88 "A number of the dogs were not provided
food or water and what food was made available was often
unsanitary, with water green in color."' 89 Further, "[m]any of the dogs
and puppies were kept in very crowded and inhumane conditions,"
being in need of "necessary veterinary treatment," and having coats
with extensive matting problems. 9 ° The facility was full of feces, and
"huge numbers of maggots" were infesting the feces in one cage."'9
Some "puppies were kept on wire mesh, which allowed large amounts
of feces to collect on the unemptied trays beneath their cages, and
trapped them, as their legs slipped through, making them
immobile."' 9 z The court found that this evidence would be sufficient
for a reasonable trier of fact to find "that the defendants unlawfully
and knowingly confined the dogs in a cruel manner and unreasonably
failed to provide necessary care."' 9 3 While puppy mills often have
some of the worst conditions for companion animals allowable, the
court showed there is a clear limit to what is allowed and that cruelty
to animals will not be permitted.
Companion animals have, thus, steadily gained more rights as
time has progressed. Although companion animals had little to no
protection in early colonial law, they are now the animals that enjoy

/johnsonjudy %26stanley.pdf.
186. Id. at 26.
187. Id. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14202 (2010) ("A person commits an offense who intentionally or knowingly ...[flails
unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, care or shelter for an animal in the
person's custody [or] .. . [t]ransports or confines an animal in a cruel manner . .
188. Johnson,slip op. at 26.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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the greatest protection with humans even having duties to provide
care, sustenance, and humane and sanitary living conditions. The law
is beginning to treat companion animals as something more than
property-as something "between a person and a piece of personal
'
property."194
The courts are slowly beginning to reflect this
progression as some are awarding damages based not only on market
value, but also on intrinsic value, emotional distress, or loss of
companionship. Further, punishments for animal abuse, as seen by
the enactment of Susie's Law, are also increasing with respect to
companion animals.
While there is a trend of improvement in animal protection laws,
the next section explains that this improvement is not shared by all
animals. While the law espouses humane conditions for companion
animals, the law is silent on the abuse of agricultural animals.
B. AgriculturalAnimals

Laws currently in effect in the United States provide a scarcity of
protection for agricultural animals. Today, agricultural animals,
including cows, pigs, chickens, and other poultry, are "the largest
group of animals exploited by the United States." '95 While anticruelty laws have increased their overall protection of "any
animal,"' 96 the definition of "animal" often excludes agricultural
animals. 97 Indeed, "Eighteen states exempt the practice of
slaughtering animals for food, with only some states specifying that a
humane method of slaughtering must be used." '98 Thirty states allow
branding, castrating, and dehorning, 99 and Iowa and Utah do not
consider livestock to be "animals" under their animal protection
statutes.2" California, unlike most states, has a humane slaughter
regulation that applies to chickens;2 °1 however, the regulation does
not apply to "spent hens," defined as "older chicken hens which are
considered too unproductive to retain as egg-layers."2 2 This "spent
194. Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182,183 (Civ. Ct. 1979).
195. Stephanie J. Engelsman, "World Leader"-At What Price? A Look at Lagging
American Animal ProtectionLaws, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 329, 332 (2005).

196. See supra Part II.
197. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text; infra notes 205-09 and
accompanying text.
198. Engelsman, supra note 195, at 342 (citation omitted).
199. Frasch et al., supra note 15, at 77.
200. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717B.1(1)(a) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9301(1)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2008).
201. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, §§ 1246-1246.15 (2009).
202. § 1246.1(b).
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hens" exemption was upheld in 2003 when two factory farms used
wood-chippers to kill 30,000 live "spent hens. ' 20 3 Neither the farm
workers nor owners were prosecuted because they did not violate
24
California's anti-cruelty law. 0
Federal statutes are also of little help to agricultural animals. The
Animal Welfare Act, 2 5 passed in 1970, is one of the major sources of
protection for animals in the United States today, yet it only covers
animals used for "research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition
purposes, or as ... pet[s]. ' ' 20 6 The Act does not include agricultural
animals because it exempts, among other animals, "livestock or
poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber. '2°7 Due to this farm
animal exemption, the Act specifically exempts more than ten billion
animals killed yearly on factory farms.20 8
Left without protection, these animals may be treated in
whatever way is most efficient for factory farm operators. 2 9 Lack of
regulation allows for mass confinement and feedings in factory farms,
also called Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations ("CAFOs").21 °
A CAFO, according to the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), is a form of Animal Feeding Operation ("AFO") that
meets certain EPA criteria.21 The EPA defines AFOs as entities that
"congregate animals, feed, manure and urine, dead animals, and
production operations on a small land area. Feed is brought to the
animals rather than the animals grazing or otherwise seeking feed in
pastures, fields, or on rangeland. '2 12 CAFOs, which produce "more
than 99 percent of all farmed animals raised and slaughtered in the
United States, ' 213 contain unnaturally large numbers of animals in
203. Dallas, Farmers Put Live Chickens in Wood Chippers (What the Cluck?), FREE

REPUBLIC (Apr. 14, 2003, 2:44 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/893022
/posts.
204. Id.

205. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
206. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2006).
207. § 2132(g)(3).
208. Engelsman, supra note 195, at 332.
209. See Heather Dowding, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO),
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Feb. 8, 2011, 11:22 PM), http://www.eoearth.org/article

/ConcentratedAnimalFeeding__Operation_%28CAFO%29;
Factory
Farming,
SUSTAINABLE TABLE, http://www.sustainabletable.org/issues/factoryfarming/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2012).
210. See Dowding, supra note 209; Factory Farming,supra note 209.
211. What Is a CAFO?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region7
/water/cafo/index.htm (last updated Jan. 17, 2012).
212. Id.
213. Factory Farming,FARM FORWARD, supra note 19.
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closely confined spaces: "Cattle feedlots generally contain thousands
of animals in one place, while many egg-laying businesses house one
million or more chickens., 21 ' The animals are confined indoors,
preventing them from engaging in their normal behaviors and
providing them with "little or no access to sunlight and fresh air. "215
The Humane Slaughter Act 216 is one of the few laws purporting
to protect agricultural animals. Enacted in 1958, the Humane
Slaughter Act states that "[n]o method of slaughtering or handling in
connection with slaughtering shall be deemed to comply with the
'
public policy of the United States unless it is humane. "217
What this
Act means by "humane slaughtering" is that "before being shackled,
hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut," all "cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep,
swine, and other livestock ...[must be] rendered insensible to pain
by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means
that is rapid and effective. ' 218 The Humane Slaughter Act has an
exemption for "the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any
other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby
the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused
by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid
arteries. ' 219 This exemption includes the rituals of Judaism and Islam,
where sacrificial animals are lifted up by one or both of their back
legs and, while hanging upside down, their throats are cut, causing
them to bleed to death for up to eight minutes.220 In addition to
bleeding, these animals, conscious and frightened, tend to kick and
thrash, breaking their bones and tearing ligaments. 21
The meaning of the term "other livestock" in the Humane
Slaughter Act has been defined by the United States Department of
Agriculture so that the term does not include chickens or other
poultry, 222 which make up over ninety-two percent of the ten billion
animals slaughtered annually in the United States. 223 These birds are
killed by various means that can reasonably be said to cause a
significant amount of pain, such as being immersed in boiling water. 24
214. Factory Farming, SUSTAINABLE TABLE, supra note 209.
215. Id.

216. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2006).
217. § 1902.
218. § 1902(a).
219. § 1902(b).

220. Engelsman, supra note 195, at 334.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2011).
Engelsman, supra note 195, at 335.
Id.
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While the Animal Welfare Act provides virtually no protection to
agricultural animals, the Humane Slaughter Act provides little more,
allowing painful procedures and production of animals and exempting
ninety-two percent of all agricultural animals.
Another federal law regulating agricultural animals is the
Livestock Transportation Act, enacted in 1906 to limit the amount of
time that animals could be held without food or water to twenty-eight
hours.225 Although scientific research done by the European
Commission shows that transporting animals for twenty-eight hours
22 6
without food or water is too long, the law has not changed.
According to the European Union, cattle need rest, food, and water
after only fourteen hours of transport; the European Commission
states that fourteen hours is the maximum amount of time that may
still be considered "humane."2'27 According to the European
Commission, nine hours would be better, with eleven hours of rest
immediately following.22 8 Although the European report suggests that
twenty-eight hours without food or water is inhumane,229 United
States federal law allows animals to be confined for thirty-six hours
when the owner requests an extension, without requiring a reason for
the extension.2 3 Additionally, sheep may be legally confined as long
as thirty-six hours without food, water, or rest as long as the twentyeight hour period of confinement ends at night.23 ' The Livestock
Transportation Act is another law providing only minimal protection
for factory farm animals, again leaving factory farm operators free to
choose how to treat the animals on their farms. Published reports
pigs and 120,000 cattle die annually "as a result
estimate that 260,000
2 32
of transport."
Although an initial look at the laws concerning agricultural
animals may reveal obvious differences in comparison to those laws
protecting companion animals, the following section highlights those
differences, showing specifically the conditions that are allowed as a
result of the lack of legal protection for agricultural animals. The
treatment of agricultural animals is noteworthy by itself; however, it
225. Livestock Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 59-340, 34 Stat. 607 (1906) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2006)).

226. Engelsman, supra note 195, at 337.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2)(B) (2006).

231. § 80502(a)(2).
232. Ten Fast Facts About Farmed Animal Transportin the United States, BORN FREE
USA, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/facts.php?more=l&p=829 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
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takes on new meaning when compared with the treatment of
companion animals.
C.

The Disparity

The true disparity between the law's protection of agricultural
animals and the law's protection of companion animals comes from
the treatment of the animals that is allowed by the differing laws. New
animal protection statutes, like Susie's Law, suggest a steady,
increasing concern for animal suffering in the law. Unfortunately, the
law is not providing increased protection for all animals equally. This
theme of increased protection has almost completely excluded today's
agricultural animals. There were approximately 8.7 billion chickens,233
110.9 million pigs,234 34.1 million cattle, and 851,500 calves killed for
agricultural purposes in the United States in 2011.235 In the United
States alone, "over 20 million chickens are slaughtered every 24hours. 2 36 These animals are not merely killed, but they are allowed to
suffer in ways that would not be allowed for companion animals.237
Thus, animal law, on its face and at its core, is inconsistent: It
purports to be a policy of animal protection, but openly provides
differing standards of care for agricultural animals and companion
animals.
For example, egg-laying chickens (also called cage hens or
battery hens) are only meant to produce eggs or more egg-laying
hens. As a result, male chicks that come from egg layers are not
deemed useful and will be killed as soon as they are born, either by
being put into garbage bags and suffocated by "carbon-dioxide
induced asphyxiation, or by decapitation. ' 238 This type of treatment
would be illegal if done to companion animals, such as in Aaroe,
where shooting a cat was found to have violated a statute making it
illegal to "intentionally commit[] an act to any animal which results in
the cruel death, or excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary

233. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AGRIC. STATISTICS BD., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., POULTRY SLAUGHTER 2 (2012) [hereinafter POULTRY SLAUGHTER], available at

http://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/TodaysReports/reports/psla0l12.pdf.
234. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AGRIC. STATISTICS BD., U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER 5 (2012) [hereinafter LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER],

availableat http://usda0l.library.cornell.edu/usda/current/LiveSlau/LiveSlau-01-20-2012
.pdf.
235. Id.
236. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 292.
237. Compare Part III.A (examining current legal protections for companion animals),
with Part III.B (discussing the current lack of legal protection for agricultural animals).
238. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 293.
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' 23 9 In Aaroe, the non-fatal shooting was seen as
pain or suffering.
'2
"excessive. "' If the court in Aaroe saw shooting a cat as an
"excessive" infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, then
suffocating or decapitating the chicks should also be "excessive"
under the law, but this is not the case for agricultural animals.
While chicks may be decapitated, iguanas may not. The court in
Voelker denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on allegations of
animal cruelty where the defendant decapitated three live iguanas,
stating that a jury could find the act unjustifiable, even though he
241
allegedly cooked and consumed the iguanas after he killed them.
Voelker shows a concern with the iguanas' pain that is not seen with
agricultural animals.2 42 If the defendant did in fact eat the iguanas, 243
there was some purpose to be found in the killing, and, therefore, it is
the manner of killing that a jury could find to be unjustifiable.2 4
While iguanas are protected from the cruelty of decapitation, even
though they could have been killed for the purpose of providing a
meal, chicks go through the same painful process and find no
protection under the law. The unfortunate, disparate state of the law
is simply that "[t]here are no legal restrictions on the disposal of

chicks.

245

Chickens face further painful conditions that point to the
disparities in the law. Battery hens spend their entire lives in a
"battery cage," which is a wire cage measuring twelve inches by
eighteen inches and generally holding six chickens. 246 The chickens
cannot do any of their natural behaviors, such as nesting, pecking,
dust-bathing, or even walking, and often they cannot stand up at all,
sometimes causing their feet to grow into the wire floor of the cage. 47
Chickens raised for meat, or "broiler" chickens, 4 are usually raised
in litter on the floor of a warehouse with as many as 40,000 other
chickens.249 These warehouses have no windows and no cooling,
although they usually have heating. 250 There is just enough ventilation

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Aaroe v. State, 788 So. 2d 340, 341 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
People v. Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181-84 (Crim. Ct. 1997).
See id. at 182-84.
See id. at 182.
See id. at 182-84.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 293.
Id.; see JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS 47-48,88-89 (2009).
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 293; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48, 88-89.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 293; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48,88-89.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 293; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48,88-89.
SINGER, supra note 34, at 103; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48, 88-89.
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to keep the birds from suffocating from the ammonia-filled air,
resulting from their own waste. 51 If there is ever a malfunction in
ventilation, the birds quickly suffocate.25 2 Broilers also suffocate
through "piling," where, in a nervous panic to get to safety, they pile
253
on top of each other, suffocating the lower chickens in the pile.
During the seven to eight weeks the birds live, the litter is not
changed and the birds' waste is not removed, damaging the birds'
lungs due to the dust, ammonia, and bacteria.5 4
Furthermore, chickens also suffer physical maladies, such as
"ulcerated feet, breast blisters, and hock burns" from the "rotting,
dirty, ammonia-charged litter" in which they live, 255 as well as featherloss, tumors, foot and leg deformities, and osteoporosis. 5 6 Since
broiler chickens are raised for meat, they are bred to grow quickly,
and, in fact, now grow so fast that their bones, heart, and lungs cannot
keep up, leading to crippling leg disorders, lung and heart disease,
and sudden death syndrome.25 7 Chickens also suffer from boredom. 58
The on-farm death rate from stress, injury, or disease can be up to
twenty-eight percent of all chickens. 259 Although courts may hold that
companion animals deserve to be treated by a veterinarian, 6° it seems
that courts and lawmakers have not begun to show concern for the
conditions that agricultural animals face. 26'
To prevent chickens from pecking at and injuring one another, as
they might do since they cannot establish their own pecking order in
the cages, chickens are de-beaked with a hot blade soon after birth.26 2
A bird's beak is not like a fingernail; rather, the beak contains a "thin
layer of highly sensitive soft tissue, resembling the quick of the human
nail. 2 63 De-beaking cuts through the beak, the bone, and the soft
251. SINGER, supra note 34, at 103; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48, 88-89.
252. SINGER, supra note 34, at 103.
253. Id.; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48.
254. SINGER, supra note 34, at 104; see FOER, supra note 246, at 47-48.
255. SINGER, supra note 34, at 105.
256. Factory Egg FarmingIs Bad for the Hens.,. , ENVTL. ORGANIZERS' NETWORK,
http://www.wesleyan.edu/wsa/warn/eon/batteryfarminglhens.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
257. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 294.
258. See SINGER, supra note 34, at 103.
259. Humane Farming Ass'n, Factory Farms,WILDLIFE RESCUE & REHABILITATION,
http://www.wildlife-rescue.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=63
&Itemid=60 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
260. See State v. Dresbach, 702 N.E.2d 513,516-18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
261. See supraPart III.B.
262. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 293.
263' SINGER, supra note 34, at 101 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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tissue. This process is very painful, and the pain is thought to last
several weeks. 26 Broilers and egg layers are de-beaked and they may
also have their toes removed to discourage fighting.265
Other agricultural animals face similarly harsh conditions, and
nearly all are overcrowded at least as much as the puppies in Johnson.
Pigs live in overcrowded conditions with no straw or bedding, leading
them to bite each others' tails.216 Sows, used for constant
reproduction, are kept in individual pens too small to walk or turn
around in during the entire two to three months of their pregnancy;
the sow may also be chained at the neck.267 When ready to give birth,
the sow is put in a "farrowing" (meaning "birthing") pen that allows
her "almost zero movement. 2 68 When put in the farrowing pens, the
sows may make violent attempts to escape, lasting up to three hours,
after which the sows may lay and groan or whine. 269 The confinement
used for sows prevents them from walking ten months out of each
year; if artificial insemination is used, the sow may never leave her
pen or have room to walk.27 Further, piglets are taken from their
mothers much sooner than is natural for pigs, causing distress to the
mother and piglets.27'
Pigs also become bored and stressed, and many die from the
stress in a phenomenon called "porcine stress syndrome. ' 272 As one
commentator explained, "[P]igs are so sensitive that they develop
neurotic behaviors such as self-mutilation when in captivity. ' 273 Most
pigs live entirely confined indoors, and their lungs are damaged from
the ammonia-filled air caused by accumulation of the animals'
waste. 274 To help with this waste problem, floors are slated or solid
concrete, which results in extraordinarily high rates of foot and leg
damage.2 75 To prevent tail biting, farmers dock the tails of pigs with
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See id. at 102.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 294.
SINGER, supra note 34, at 120-21.
Id. at 126.
FAVRE, supra note 32, at 291; see SINGER, supra note 34, at 126.
SINGER, supra note 34, at 127.
Id. at 128.
Id.at 125.
Id.at 122.

273. MELANIE JOY, WHY WE LOVE DOGS, EAT PIGS, AND WEAR COWS: AN

INTRODUCTION TO CARNISM 26 (2010).
274. SINGER, supra note 34, at 123-24; Getting To Know the Pig Behind Your Bacon,
FOOD CONNECT, http://brisbane.foodconnect.com.au/inspiration/agrarian-revolution
/getting-to-know-the-pig-behind-your-bacon/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (noting that "60%
of breeding sows and 93% of pigs reared for meat live their lives almost entirely indoors").
275. SINGER, supranote 34, at 124.
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side-cutting pliers or some other blunt instrument. 276 The on-farm
death rate is around fourteen percent of all pigs. 77
Cattle face similar conditions. Dairy cows are kept in one of the
following: "tie-stall barns, where they spend their life tethered by
their neck to a stall; free-stall barns, where cattle are kept indoors and
provided stalls for milking and rest; or dry lots, which is an area with
no vegetation where the cattle are kept between trips to the milking
' A dairy cow is milked two to three times a day for ten
barn."278
months of the year, being kept pregnant in order to sustain milk
production. 279 Beef cattle are generally raised in dry lots, 2 80 or indoors
in pens.281 Like pigs, cattle suffer from boredom. 2" Outdoor cattle
suffer from exposure to the elements. 23 As with pigs, dairy cattle
usually have their tails docked.2 " Around half of all dairy cows
develop mastitis, a bacterial infection of their udder,285 and, being
sensitive animals, the cows manifest psychological and physiological
distress as a result.286
Calves used for veal are chained as newborns28 7 in a stall so
narrow that the calf cannot turn around, has trouble standing up, and
cannot lie flat. 288 Raising veal calves has been called "the most
morally repugnant" of all farm practices.28 9 The calves are fed only a
liquid diet based on milk powder and vitamins, and there is no straw
in the stall so that the calves will not eat the straw and ruin the
tenderness of their flesh.290 The liquid formula makes the calves grow
quickly; to make them drink it, they are generally given no water.291
2 92
They are often kept in the dark over twenty-two hours each day.
Veal calves are kept anemic, or iron deficient, as iron makes the flesh
276. Id. at 121.
277. Humane Farming Ass'n, supra note 259.
278. Animal Welfare, SUSTAINABLE TABLE, http://www.sustainabletable.org/issues
/animalwelfare/ (last updated Sept. 2009).
279. SINGER, supra note 34, at 137.
280. Animal Welfare, supra note 278.
281. SINGER, supra note 34, at 140.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. Animal Welfare, supra note 278.
285. Factory Dairy Production, FARM SANCTUARY, INC., http://www.farmsanctuary
.org/issues/factoryfarming/dairy/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
286. SINGER, supra note 34, at 137.
287. Id. at 132.
288. Id. at 129-31.
289. Id. at 129.
290. Id. at 130.
291. Id. at 134.
292. Id. at 135.
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darker and less valuable.2 93 They often develop digestive disorders,
including stomach ulcers and chronic diarrhea, as a result. 29 4 The onfarm death rate is approximately four percent of all cattle and
calves.295
Companion animals are protected from these conditions by laws
governing the standards of care for companion animals held in
confinement.29 6 Agricultural animals, however, enjoy much lower
standards of living and care. The living conditions on factory farms
are unsanitary to the point of being unhealthy or even fatal, greatly
surpassing the conditions allowing for conviction in the puppy mill
case of State v. Johnson.2' The Johnson court noted not only the
unsanitary conditions of the puppy mill, but also the poor or
nonexistent means of cooling the puppies, the smell of ammonia in
the air from the puppies' waste, the overcrowded conditions, the lack
of water, and the immobility of the puppies 29 8 -all conditions which
are present on factory farms. The court found these conditions
sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that the defendant "confined
the dogs in a cruel manner and unreasonably failed to provide
necessary care" and to convict on those grounds. 299 The conditions for
agricultural animals, then, would likely support a conviction for
cruelty under Johnson, if the animals involved were companion
animals.'3° These same conditions, however, are legal for agricultural
animals.
The treatment of agricultural animals, therefore, contrasts starkly
with companion animals. Many states' anti-cruelty statutes prevent
the "torture" of animals.30' Susie's Law, for example, increases the
punishment for maliciously torturing, cruelly beating, maiming,
mutilating, poisoning, or killing an animal,"' defining "torture" and
"cruelly" to "include or refer to any act, omission, or neglect causing

293. Id. at 133.
294. Id. at 132.

295. Humane Farming Ass'n, supra note 259.
296. See, e.g., 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2.10 (West 2004); supra Part III.A.
297. State v. Johnson, No. W2001-01272-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 26 (Tenn. Crim. App.
June 26, 2002), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca
/PDF/022/johnsonjudy%26stanley.pdf.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See id.
301. See, e.g., Horton v. State, 27 So. 468, 468 (Ala. 1900); Elisea v. State, 777 N.E.2d
46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Witham, 2005 ME 79, 5, 876 A.2d 40, 41-42; State v.
Dresbach, 702 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
302. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(b) (2011); see Bowens, supra note 13.
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or permitting unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death."303 If agricultural
animals were not generally exempted from protection statutes, then
the conditions that these animals face could be seen as a violation of
this statute or as causing unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering
that is prohibited under most animal anti-cruelty laws. 3"
Furthermore, causing and allowing the physical illnesses of
animals to continue would likely be prohibited under Dresbach,
which upheld the defendant's conviction for not providing veterinary
care to a dog with hookworms. °5 Agricultural animals face many
severe mental and physical ailments that go untreated. As one farm
worker stated in reference to pigs, "They all have sores .... There's

hardly a pig in there who doesn't have a sore."30 6 The Dresbach court
held that causing, permitting, or allowing "unnecessary or
unjustifiable pain or suffering" to continue, "when there is a
reasonable remedy or relief," would violate a duty to provide
veterinary care, would be considered "torture," and would violate
anti-cruelty statutes.3 7 There is no doubt that some of the permitted
practices on CAFOs cause agricultural animals unnecessary pain.
One pig producer stated, in reference to pig tail docking:
They hate it! The pigs just hate it! And I suppose we could
probably do without tail-docking if we gave them more room,
because they don't get so crazy and mean when they have more
space. With enough room, they're actually quite nice animals.
But we can't afford it. These buildings cost a lot.308
The same external signs that humans use to infer pain may be
seen in other species, especially in mammals and birds, since they are
most closely related to humans.3 9 These signs include "writhing,
facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms of calling,
attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the
prospect of its repetition, and so on."31 0 Additionally, animals and

humans have similar nervous systems, meaning that animals' nervous
systems respond physiologically in the same way as human nervous

303. § 14-360(c).
304. See, e.g., Aaroe v. State, 788 So. 2d 340, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); People v.
Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d 180,181 (Crim. Ct. 1997); Dresbach,702 N.E.2d at 515-16.
305. Dresbach,702 N.E.2d at 516-18.
306. FOER, supranote 246, at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Dresbach,702 N.E.2d at 515-16 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
308. SINGER, supra note 34, at 121.
309. Id. at 11.
310. Id.
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systems in situations where humans would feel pain.3 ' There is no
doubt that these animals suffer.
There are several arguments that show that the pain and
suffering of agricultural animals is often "unnecessary." First, it might
be argued that raising and killing animals for food is unnecessary, as
vegetarian diets are at least as nutritionally adequate as diets
including meat.312 Even if one considers meat to be an essential part
of life, however, the suffering of agricultural animals is still
preventable. As stated above, for example, tail-docking would likely
be unnecessary if pigs were given more room.313 De-beaking is also

unnecessary when chickens are given adequate living space.3 14 There
is no reason to separate mothers and their young so early or provide
such highly unsanitary and overcrowded living conditions or to allow
animals to suffer such high rates of disease and injury, apart from
economic profit. For example, the Johnson court found that the
owners "unreasonably" failed to provide "necessary care" for the
puppies,"' even though the overcrowded, unsanitary, and unhealthy
conditions likely increased the owners' economic profit. It is likely
unnecessary to kill all male chicks that are born to egg-laying hens. It
is also likely unnecessary to keep the animals in such poor living
conditions that many of them die at the factory farm before slaughter
or during transport to slaughter. The conditions facing agricultural
animals would likely not be found to be necessary and would be a
violation of animal anti-cruelty statutes, such as the statute in
Dresbach, if these animals were treated like companion animals.
Whether the treatment of these animals is "unjustifiable," which
some anti-cruelty statutes require,316 is a more difficult question. If a
defendant's act of cutting the heads off live iguanas, which he later
allegedly ate, could be sufficient for a jury to find the infliction of pain
unjustifiable,3 17 then at least some juries might agree that similar

abuse of agricultural animals is also unjustifiable. The problem,

311. Id.
312. See infra notes 393-98 and accompanying text.
313. See SINGER, supra note 34, at 121.
314. Id. at 102.
315. State v. Johnson, No. W2001-01272-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 26 (Tenn. Crim. App.
June 26, 2002), available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcea
/PDF/022/johnsonjudy%26stanley.pdf.
316. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c) (2011).
317. People v. Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183 (Crim. Ct. 1997) (stating that the matter
of whether defendant "unjustifiably" committed the acts was best left to the trier of fact
and declining to dismiss the case).
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however, is that this treatment is not generally considered animal
abuse under law, so criminal charges, as stated, are rarely brought.
IV. REASONS FOR THE DISPARITY

The disparate legal treatment of companion and agricultural
animals is clear. What is not clear, however, is the reason for this
disparity. This Part looks into possible reasons and justifications for
that disparity.
A.

CharacterTraits of Companion Animals and Agricultural
Animals

An obvious and common justification is that companion animals
and agricultural animals are quite different from one another, the
former possessing qualities deserving of protection and the latter
possessing qualities justifying their slaughter for human use. In truth,
however, there are more similarities between companion and
agricultural animals than differences. The concurring opinion in
Bueckner v. Hamel notes that dogs are such beloved pets, often
considered members of the family, because of the traits they embody:
"These represent some of the best of human traits, including loyalty,
' These traits, however, are not
trust, courage, playfulness, and love."318
unique to dogs.
Intelligence is prized in dogs and cats, but agricultural animals
are often at least as intelligent as companion animals. Pigs are the
most intelligent of agricultural animals.3"9 They are as intelligent and
as capable of being trained to respond to commands as dogs.3 20 Pigs,
like dogs, enjoy playing with toys. 21 Pigs are also as adept as dogs at
problem-solving, and they have a way of understanding other pigs
that "has often been assumed to be unique to apes and humans. '"322
Pigs "have an understanding of what is going on in other pigs' minds
and make their own decisions accordingly in order to get what they
want. 3 23 Certain pigs were even taught by a scientist to play a video

318. Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J.,
concurring).
319. SINGER, supra note 34, at 119.
320. Id.; see FOER, supranote 246, at 101.
321. MATTHEW SCULLY, DOMINION 241-42 (2002) (describing the sophistication with
which pigs play with toys and the improvements in pig behavior, which result in higher
quality meat).
322. FAvRE, supra note 32, at 289.
323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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game with a joystick they could operate with their snouts. 2 4
Surprisingly, the pigs learned the game as quickly as chimpanzees.3 5
Like dogs, pigs are active, inquisitive, and extremely social,
forming bonds with other pigs, other animal species, and even
humans. 326 Pigs value and seek out close contact with others.32 They
use over twenty vocalizations to communicate with other pigs 328 and,
in fact, "[p]igs may be able to recognize and remember up to 20-30
individuals. 3 29 Pigs undoubtedly have the courage and loyalty praised
in dogs in Bueckner,33' as they will defend one another and even one
another's piglets.33 ' Piglets stay with their mothers even after they are
weaned, and "[t]wo or more sows and their piglets usually join
together in an extended family," creating close bonds between one
another.332 Thus, pigs appear to have many of the prized traits of dogs
and certainly those traits noted in Bueckner.
Pigs are not the only agricultural animals possessing traits valued
by humans. Chickens, perhaps surprisingly, are "highly social
animals," developing a social hierarchy when not enclosed on factory
farms.333 Furthermore, "studies have shown that a flock of up to
ninety chickens can maintain a stable social order, each bird knowing
its place [in the hierarchy]. ' 34 Additionally, when not in captivity,
chickens will care for other chickens who are ill or injured, and even
kill the sick chickens if necessary,335 showing a basic level of concern
for one another and for the flock as a whole. Chickens can even
"deceive one another and can delay [present] satisfaction for larger
rewards. ' 33 6 Hens also feel stress when put in overcrowded
conditions, just as humans do.337 Chickens make up for their
differences in physical appearance from dogs and humans by
exhibiting mental capabilities similar to both. Chickens, similarly,
possess desirable qualities of sociability and affection.
324. FOER, supra note 246, at 64-65.
325. Id.
326. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 289; see FOER, supra note 246, at 101-02.
327. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 290.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J.,
concurring).
331. FAVRE, supra note 32, at 289-90.
332. Id. at 290.
333. SINGER, supra note 34, at 99.
334. Id. at 100.
335. Id. at 102.
336. FOER, supra note 246, at 66.
337. SINGER, supra note 34, at 113-14.
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Cows, too, are not nearly as different from companion animals as
one might expect. They are "sensitive animals who manifest both
psychological and physiological disturbances as a result of stress."33' 8
' One
Cows "have a strong need to identify with their caretakers."339
farm worker even had a cow lick his face and lean against him for a
period of time before he slaughtered her.3 40 Cows also show the
prized trait of affection in that "young calves sorely miss their
mothers. 3 41 For example, "[w]hen cows are weaned, both the cows
and calves bellow for about twenty-four hours. ' 342 Further, "[c]attle
will also bellow for departed penmates. 3 43 Veal calves, particularly,
become bored and restless because their environment does not allow
them to be as active as they would like to be.34
Thus, while pigs, chickens, and cows may behave differently than
dogs or cats, there are few inherent differences in the animals when it
comes to the fundamental traits of intelligence, communication, social
aptitude, playfulness, loyalty, and affection. For example, a dog may
be able to fetch better than a cow or chicken, but perhaps not better
than a pig.345 Also, cows, contrary to what some may think, express as
much affection toward humans as the average dog or cat. Agricultural
animals, then, are only different from companions animals in the way
that one species is different from another, or in the same way that a
dog is different from a cat. These animals do not show any apparent
traits that should allow for or justify their exclusion from the
protection of animal anti-cruelty laws. This distinction between
coompanion animals and agricultural animals, then, appears to be
arbitrary.
B.

The Advent of FactoryFarming

Another possible reason for the disparity between legal
treatment of companion animals and agricultural animals is the
advent of factory farming. One of the earliest examples of the switch
from traditional farming to factory farming came in the 1920s when
338. Id. at 137.
339. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. FOER, supra note 246, at 161-62.
341. SINGER, supra note 34, at 132.
342. SCULLY, supra note 321, at 245 (quoting TEMPLE GRANDIN, THINKING IN
PICTURES 168 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
343. Id. (quoting GRANDIN, supra note 342, at 168) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
344. See SINGER, supra note 34, at 135.
345. See FOER, supra note 246, at 25 (observing that pigs "can fetch, run, and play, be
mischievous, and reciprocate affection").
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Ms. Cecile Steele of Maryland, who had ordered fifty chicks 34to6
expand her flock of egg-laying hens, received 500 chicks by mistake.
Steele kept the chicks, built a shed for them, and raised them indoors
for their meat, selling them for a better profit than eggs would have
brought.347 Other farmers copied Steele, and chickens became the
first factory farmed animal, with pigs and cows following in the
1960s.348
Traditional farming, evoking ideas of animals roaming and
grazing outdoors, was rarely as "idyllic" for agricultural animals as
many people believe. 349 However, "[t]here was a time when these
creatures rated a certain respect from those who reared them for
slaughter-unsentimental, and yet shown in a minimal attentiveness
to their needs. '350 Now, farming is an automated process with animals
"[g]enetically designed by machines, inseminated by machines, fed by
machines, monitored, herded, electrocuted, stabbed, cleaned, cut, and
packed by machines-themselves treated like machines from birth to
bacon-these creatures, when eaten, have hardly ever been touched
by human hands. '' 35 1 As a result of streamlining the agricultural
production process, meat-producing farms have become less
numerous; however, with the substantial increase in human
population over the last century, they have become both more
35 2
efficient and unavoidable.
While agriculture traditionally consisted of many small farms,
with 24% of Americans employed in agriculture before World War
II, farming is now handled by only a small number of companies with
only 1.5% of Americans currently employed in agriculture.3 53 The
rationing of red meat during World War II and the promise of "a
chicken in every pot" led agricultural companies to focus on
increasing the production of chickens for meat.35 4 Further,
government subsidies and cheap corn prices helped concentrate the
raising of agricultural animals into a relatively small number of large
farming operations. 55 More than ever, farming is now concerned with
346.

DANIELLE NIERENBERG, HAPPIER MEALS: RETHINKING THE GLOBAL MEAT

INDUSTRY 13 (Lisa Mastney ed., 2005).

347. Id. at 14.
348. Id. at 14-15.
349. SINGER, supra note 34, at 96.
350. SCULLY, supra note 321, at 29.
351. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
352. See id. at 29-30.
353. Id. at 29; see NIERENBERG, supra note 346, at 6.
354. See NIERENBERG, supra note 346, at 15, 17.
355. See id.
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"cut[ting] costs and increas[ing] production,"35' 6 leaving animal
interests greatly overwhelmed by commercialism.
When the focus on agricultural animals shifted to a focus on
profitability and production, agricultural animals were divided from
companion animals. The latter gained protection from laws that were
concerned with protecting animals for their own sake. Agricultural
animals, however, were placed outside the "sphere of moral
consideration," treated as merely "things used by humans to satisfy
[human] desires."3'57 This change in attitude toward agricultural
animals is largely the result of modern factory farming practices,
whereby agricultural "[a]nimals are treated like machines that
convert low-priced fodder into high-priced flesh, and any innovation
will be used if it results in a cheaper conversion ratio."35' 8 Today there
is a significant disparity between the legal protection of companion
animals and that of agricultural animals, leaving the latter to face the
harsh conditions of factory farms with almost no legal protection at
all.
C.

Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows 359

Although the advent of factory farming may explain why
agricultural animals lost nearly all rights, it cannot explain why
Americans originally chose to love dogs and cats, while eating pigs,
cows, and chickens. Melanie Joy, author of Why We Love Dogs, Eat
Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism, argues that
humans "react differently to different types of meat not because there
is a physical difference between them, but because [humans']
perception of them is different."36 Humans may view cows and dogs
differently because the only contact people often have with cows is
when they are eating or wearing them.361 The human relationship with
dogs, however, is often very similar to relationships between
people.3 62 Dogs are "man's best friend," and eating dog meat is
"taboo.3 363 "Dogs go with cats, kids, and firemen. We share our food
and beds with [dogs], bring them on planes and to doctors, take joy in

356.

SINGER,

supra note 34, at 97; see NIERENBERG, supra note 346, at 5.

357. SINGER, supra note 34, at 97.

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
JOY, supra note 273.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
363. FOER, supra note 246, at 24.
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their joy, and mourn their deaths. ''3 6 Different cultures have different
taboos about meat: 365 "[A] Hindu might have the same response to
beef as an American Christian would to dog meat. ' ' 36 These different
perceptions are a result of the different "schemas," or the
"psychological framework that shapes-and is shaped by-[human]
beliefs, ideas, perceptions, and experiences, and [that] automatically
'
organizes and interprets incoming information."367
Humans have
schemas for animals, organizing them into groups that are either pets
or food.368
When humans reject meat from certain animals as inedible, it is
generally because we picture the animal alive and with that image
comes disgust and refusal to eat it.369 However, when most Americans
see beef, they do not make the connection to the living being; instead,
they see the beef only as food and have no trouble eating it.37°
Children are taught to eat meat at an early age,37 ' so cows, pigs, and
chickens are right away seen by Americans as animals meant for food.
Not only is the truth of how meat is made hidden from Americans by
the intensive production systems of factory farms, but also the
distance between the slaughterhouse and the dinner plate makes it
easy for Americans to not know-or to "choose not to know"-where
their meat comes from.3 7 2 Further, how humans treat animals informs
their perception of them: "The more we don't eat dogs and do eat
cows, the more we reinforce the belief that dogs are inedible and
cows are edible. 37 3
While Joy's reasoning explains why Americans now continue to
eat cows, pigs, and chickens, rather than dogs or cats, the question
still remains: why exactly have Americans chosen dogs and cats as
pets, while choosing cows, pigs, and chickens as those animals
deserving of slaughter? One theory suggests that "[s]ome early
humans may have started eating meat as a way to survive within their
' Archeological findings
own ecological niche."374
indicate that the dog

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 29.
See JOY, supra note 273, at 13 n.*.
Id. at 14.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 15.
See id.
See SINGER, supra note 34, at 213-14.
372. NIERENBERG, supra note 346, at 8.
373. JOY, supra note 273, at 16.
374. Hillary Mayell, "Evolving To Eat Mush": How Meat Changed Our Bodies, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2005), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/02
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was the first domesticated animal, likely domesticated around the end
of the last Ice Age, about 10,000 to 14,000 years ago.375 When early
humans were hunting for food, they likely caught some wolf pups and
kept them for eating later.3 76 Some pups, however, were not eaten,
and as they grew up, a few grew tame to humans.377 The first
domesticated dogs were likely used by humans to help with hunting
other animals for food.3 78 On the other hand, cats may have
domesticated themselves, entering human communities around 10,000
years ago for protection from larger wild animals and being tolerated
by humans because they caught rodents in the humans' houses and
granaries.37 9

The domestication of dogs and cats may appear to explain their
special status as companion animals, but this is not quite so. While it
may make sense to favor the first domesticated animal and fellow
hunting partner of humans, or to protect an animal that provides
some service to humans other than food, not all societies feel this
way:
Fourth-century tombs contain depictions of dogs being
slaughtered along with other food animals.... Hippocrates
praised dog meat as a source of strength. The Romans ate
"suckling puppy," Dakota Indians enjoyed dog liver, and not so
long ago Hawaiians ate dog brains and blood.... And dogs are
still eaten to overcome bad luck in the Philippines; as medicine
in China and Korea; to enhance libido in Nigeria; and in
numerous places, on every continent, because they taste
good. 380
3 81
Cats are still eaten in China, Vietnam, and parts of South America.
Thus, as Joy writes, human eating habits are based on human
perceptions of animals. These perceptions come from what humans

/0218 050218 human diet.html.
375. Juliet Clutton-Brock, Origins of the Dog: Domestication and Early History, in THE
DOMESTIC DOG: ITS EVOLUTION, BEHAVIOUR, AND INTERACTiONS WITH PEOPLE 7, 10

(James

Serpell ed.,

1995); Peter

Savolainen,

Domestication of Dogs, in THE

BEHAVIOURAL BIOLOGY OF DOGS 21.22 (Per Jensen ed., 2007).

376. Clutton-Brock, supra note 375, at 8.
377. Id. at 8, 10.
378. Id. at 10.
379. Nicholas Wade, Study Traces Cat's Ancestry to Middle East, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2007, at A8.
380. FOER, supra note 246, at 26.
381. Emily Chang, Inside the Cat and Dog Meat Market in China, CNN (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-09/world/china.animals-l-dog-meat-cats-and-dogsnumber-of-pet-owners?_s= PM:WORLD.
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are raised to eat, what animals humans interact with, and cultural
taboos. The truth at the heart of eating habits, however, is that they
are arbitrary. An animal's standing in society is not based on how
early his species was domesticated or how useful his species has been
to humankind. What a society eats is based on nothing more than
what that society's ancestors started raising and eating, whether out
of convenience or necessity, having no basis in the animal's
intelligence, sensitivity to pain, or affection toward humans. In other
words, "The French, who love their dogs, sometimes eat their horses.
The Spanish, who love their horses, sometimes eat their cows. The
Indians, who love their cows, sometimes eat their dogs."38' 2 The law
reflecting these cultural norms is, thus, arbitrary itself, setting vastly
different standards for animals with little logical reason for doing so.
V. GOING FORWARD
If one accepts that there is a discrepancy between the laws
protecting agricultural animals and companion animals and that there
is no reason for this discrepancy, then the next logical step is to
determine what must be done. The first question to consider is
whether there is a problem with this disparity. Is it acceptable to treat
animals in significantly different ways on an arbitrary basis? In the
American legal system, the answer should be no.
The discrepancies in animal law create a problem for the
American legal system. Americans like to think of the law as "just."
The Preamble to the United States Constitution itself states, "We the
People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
'
Exactly what "just" or "justice" is may be
establish Justice."383
just,
debated, but a common definition is "the quality of being
384
impartial, or fair," or "conformity to truth, fact, or reason."
If the law is meant to be just, there must be some justification for
treating companion and agricultural animals so differently. Treating
one set of animals as if their suffering matters, while condoning the
suffering of different animals in similar conditions, cannot be seen as
"fair," "impartial," or based on "reason," unless there is a reason to
do so. Allowing the disparity due to tradition cannot be a sufficient
reason in a true justice system, as this does not alleviate the law's
unfairness, partiality, and lack of logical reason. Further, the law has
not always treated agricultural animals with such indifference. At one
382. FOER, supra note 246, at 25.
383. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
384. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 679(llth ed. 2005).
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point, the law afforded them a minimal level of protection. This
change in their treatment by the law, then, needs some sort of
justification, or else the law must be arbitrary, full of inconsistencies
and double-standards of protection.38 5 Only a justification for this
disparity can relieve animal law of its unwarranted discrepancies. The
disparity, however, has no justification; thus, it must be eliminated.
The simplest way to completely eliminate this disparity is to treat
agricultural animals and companion animals in the same manner. This
would entail bringing agricultural animals under the same laws as
companion animals and providing them with the same protections.
While changing the laws in this manner would affect several aspects
of animal treatment, those animals first and foremost affected would
be agricultural animals on CAFOs. As explained above, the current
living conditions on CAFOs are much worse than those conditions
leading to conviction in the puppy mill case of State v. Johnson.386 On
a most basic level, this restructuring of CAFOs would entail giving
the animals room to move about, rather than keeping them
immobilized in cages;387 keeping their living situations sanitary, rather
than allowing waste and ammonia to build up on the floor;388 and
prohibiting painful and unnecessary procedures, such as de-beaking
and tail docking.389
It is doubtful that uniform legal protection for all animals would
still allow the slaughter of animals for food. Statutes allowing for
harm to companion animals when necessary sometimes add when
''necessary to preserve the safety of property or to overcome danger
or injury," 3" which would not allow for harm to animals to produce

385. For example, ordinances forbid tethering dogs for more than three hours a day,
yet do not prohibit immobilizing veal calves for months. See, e.g., Raleigh Passes Dog
Tethering Ordinance,WRAL (June 30, 2009), http://www.wral.com/news/news-briefs/story
/4662009/.
386. See supra Part III.C.
387. See State v. Johnson, No. W2001-01272-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 26 (Tenn. Crim.
App.
June
26,
2002),
available
at
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/tcca
/PDF/022/johnsonjudy%26stanley.pdf. In upholding the conviction of eleven counts of
animal cruelty against the owners and operators of a puppy mill, the court noted that the
puppies were kept in cages of wire mesh, which allowed their legs to slip through the
bottom and left them immobilized, and that "[m]any of the dogs and puppies were kept in
very crowded and inhumane conditions." Id.
388. See id. (noting that the puppies were kept in "filthy and unsanitary" conditions).
389. See Elisea v. State, 777 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding the
conviction of a defendant who cropped two puppies' ears without anesthesia and left the
ears unbound and not sutured).
390. People v. Voelker, 658 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183 (Crim. Ct. 1997).
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food. Further, it is illegal to eat dog meat in six states,3 9' so in those
states at least, consumption of agricultural animals would not be
allowed if agricultural animals were treated the same as companion
animals.
Two related arguments would likely arise. First, treating
agricultural animals equivalently to companion animals would be too
expensive and unprofitable. Second, since humans need meat for
nutrition, these animals must be produced as they currently are. 392
These arguments fail for two main reasons. First, it is not at all
necessary for humans to eat animals. "[A]ppropriately planned
vegetarian diets are now recognized by many, including the American
Dietetic Association, as being nutritionally adequate, and providing
healthful benefits in the prevention and treatment of chronic
diseases."3 93 The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine

("PCRM") has found not only that meat does not ensure adequate
nutrition, but also that "vegetarian diets have remarkable health
benefits and can help prevent certain diseases, such as cancer,
diabetes, and heart disease."394 In fact, "[t]he total direct medical
costs in the United States attributable to meat consumption were
estimated to be $30-60 billion a year, based upon the higher
prevalence of hypertension, heart disease, cancer, diabetes,
gallstones, obesity and food-borne illness among omnivores
' PCRM recommends a vegetarian diet
compared with vegetarians."395
and states that a vegan diet is the healthiest of all.396 Further, the 2010
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, published by the United States
Department of Agriculture and the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, acknowledge that a vegetarian diet,
devoid of all seafood, has "been associated with improved health
391. See FOER, supra note 246, at 24.
392. SINGER, supra note 34, at 121 (noting that pigs' tails would likely not need to be
docked if the pigs were given more room, but that more room would be too expensive);
David J. Yount, Eight Arguments in Favor of Eating Meat and Objections Thereto,
http://www.mesacc.edu/-yount/text/meatarg.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
393. Winston Craig, Health Benefits of Vegetarian Diets, VEGETARIANNUTRITION.INFO, http://www.vegetarian-nutrition.info/updates/vegetariandietshealth
_benefits.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
394. Frequently Asked Questions About Nutrition, PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR
RESPONSIBLE
MED.,
http://www.pcrm.orgfhealth/diets/vegdiets/frequently-askedquestions-about-nutrition#RecommendVegDiet (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); see also Jai
Maharaj,
U.S. Physicians Say Meat Not Necessary, Actually Harmful,
http://www.flex.com/-jai/articles/nomeatht.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (asserting that
"consumption of meat, fish, poultry and dairy products actually causes disease").
395. Craig, supra note 393.
396. PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., supra note 394.
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outcomes-lower levels of obesity, a reduced risk of cardiovascular
disease, and lower total mortality."3' 97 The Guidelines state that
"[sleveral clinical trials have documented that vegetarian eating
patterns lower blood pressure.398 Therefore, eating meat is
unnecessary.
Second, aside from the health argument, there is a moral
argument for treating agricultural animals more humanely. Although
it would be feasible to industrially farm dogs and cats, Americans
refrain from doing so. If there is something about companion animals
that has warranted human affection, care, and protection and that has
pushed the legislatures of individual states to enact these sentiments
into law, then agricultural animals should be treated no differently,
regardless of cost. Americans spend approximately $41 billion on
companion animals each year-"more than the gross domestic
'
product of all but 64 countries in the world."399
If companion animals
are receiving this much financial support for everything from vet bills
to "frilly canine ball gowns, ' 40 then it is certainly not a stretch to
require that more financial resources be put into providing better
living conditions for agricultural animals.
Individuals, of course, may be disinclined to give up their chicken
nuggets or steak.40 ' Personal desire, however, provides no justification
in the case of abuse of companion animals. There can be little doubt
that the couple in State v. Johnson would have preferred to have been
left alone, out of court, and free to run their puppy mill as they chose.
The law, however, stepped in to provide protection to the dogs in that
case based on an ideal greater than the desires of the defendants-the
idea that companion animals deserve better treatment than what was
given to the dogs there. In the case of agricultural animals, the law
should now start providing protection.

397. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIETARY

GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS, 2010, at 45 (2010), available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov
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CONCLUSION

Susie's Law is a successful advancement of animal law in North
Carolina. However, like other animal laws, while Susie's Law
proclaims application to "any animal," its protection is strictly
reserved to companion animals, excluding the billions of agricultural
animals killed in America annually.? ° Since any minor differences
between companion animals and agricultural animals do not merit
protection for one class of animals and suffering for the other, the
law's blatant division of protection is an arbitrary anomaly in the
justice system. There is no reason why the pain that puppies feel
because of a slipshod ear cropping merits punishment, while the tail
docking of livestock and de-beaking of chickens occurs legally each
day. Such obvious inequities cannot command respect for the law or
justice system.
The easiest solution for animal law is to extend protection to
"any animal," rather than merely companion animals. Providing
uniform legal protection to every cow, pig, chicken, dog, cat, and any
other animal would allow greater consistency in the law, and it would
substantially decrease the suffering of billions of animals. While
improving the conditions for animals on factory farms may decrease
profitability for producers, legislation shows that Americans value
animal protection and generally feel that animal suffering is morally
reprehensible. The law should apply this value equally. If one
suffering animal deserves protection, why not protect all suffering
animals?
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